Ken | Mathis Lohatepanont
Ph.D. Candidate
Political Science
University of Michigan
  • After an unexpectedly eventful 2024, which saw the fall of the Srettha Thavisin administration, the dissolution of the Move Forward Party, and the appointment of Paetongtarn Shinawatra as prime minister, 2025 is shaping up to be another year to watch out for in Thai politics, as the Pheu Thai government enters a new year in office.

    By May 2025 the term of this government would be mid-way and preparations for the next General Elections would likely start as early as the end of this year.

    Here are three things to watch for as we progress through the year.

    Click here to read the full piece at Thai Enquirer.

  • My friend Kwan Limbhasut runs an education advisory service, and she invited me to have a conversation on her channel about what the social sciences are, and how aspiring social scientists can navigate potential career options in Thailand. Check out the two episodes below!

  • On the first day of the year, then-prime minister Srettha Thavisin declared that Thailand was about to enter a new era “that will make up of nine years of missed opportunities.” As 2024 comes to a close, it is worth taking a look at how this year unfolded in Thai politics— although just the fact that the man who made this prediction is no longer in office is indicative enough of how things have turned out.

    Click here to read the full piece at Thai Enquirer.

  • I was on Suthichai Yoon’s English show with former Minister attached to the Office of the Prime Minister, K. Suranand Vejjajiva, to discuss Thaksin Shinawatra’s recent moves.

  • I was on Suthichai Yoon’s show to discuss Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s first one hundred days. The show was recorded in Thai.

  • For superstitious Thais, a lot of factors go into determining fortunes — hence why expert astrologers are needed to help everything from names to founding times. For the newly formed People’s Party (PP), successor to the Move Forward Party, some may start wondering whether now is the time to question if the spiritual consultants had gotten something wrong. Not much has gone right for the party since its formation back in August.

    First, the party had lost multiple local races back in September. Then, on Sunday, elections for chairman of the Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) were held in three provinces: Udon Thani, Petchaburi, and Nakhon Si Thammarat. The People’s Party (PP) dealt another heavy defeat in their quest to win the race in Udon Thani. (For those unfamiliar with Thailand’s byzantine system for local governance, each province has two top officials in parallel roles: one elected and one appointed. While the provincial governor is selected by the Ministry of Interior, the PAO Chairman is elected by voters.)

    On one hand, the party’s defeat in Udon Thani should not be a surprise. Udon Thani is considered a key capital city of the Thaksin Shinawatra-supporting red shirt movement. There had been some warning signs for the Pheu Thai Party in the 2023 election, when the party, which previously won all the seats province-wide, lost a few to now defunct Move Forward and the Thai Sang Thai Party. But Pheu Thai had still won a solid 41 percent of the vote in 2023 and 7 out of 10 parliamentary seats.

    Click here for the full piece at Thai Enquirer.

  • One of the biggest open questions in Thai politics is 1) what the “grand compromise” between the Thaksinites and the conservatives entailed, and 2) whether or not there is a possibility that it might fracture. Back when I co-wrote this piece on the grand compromise, the state of the grand compromise still looked pretty tidy: the conservatives were still largely united as a bloc and remained fully allied with Pheu Thai, the Move Forward Party was still left largely alone in the cold, and the status quo looked like it could hold on for the time being.

    The second half of the year, of course, brought on several incidents that shook up the political landscape. Thaksin Shinawatra started accusing powerbroker Prawit Wongsuwan of causing trouble, Srettha Thavisin was removed as prime minister and replaced by Thaksin’s daughter Paetongtarn in murky circumstances, and finally Prawit’s party Palang Pracharath was ejected from the coalition. Coupled with the increasing influence of Bhumjaithai, who holds sway over the Senate, the coalition was looking increasingly rickety.

    What to make, then, of the recent spat between Thaksin and Thanathorn Juangroongrueangkit, who remains the spiritual leader of the progressives and the People’s Party? Over the past week, Thaksin gave us several eyebrow-raising quotes:

    • At his first political rally in 18 years, Thaksin compared his party to the People’s Party by saying that while Pheu Thai’s local candidate only needed to have banners of himself with Paetongtarn, the PP needed ex-PM candidate Pita Limjaroenrat (implying their leader Nattapong Rueangpanyawut has no popularity)
    • Thaksin also said that he had previously warned Thanathorn of the dangers of trying to pursue too much structural change, and that “some things that were advertised may be more dangerous than the things he actually intends to do.” Thanathorn wrote a strongly worded rebuttal on social media in response, saying that Thaksin himself knew full well that their disagreements over the lese-majeste law were not the sticking point over why Pheu Thai and Move Forward could not form a coalition together, and that “instead of cooperating to solve problems, Thaksin has chosen to become part of the problem”
    • Paetongtarn, in an Instagram story that did not feel entirely prime ministerial, told Thanathorn not to “hallucinate” about Pheu Thai imposing the lese-majeste law as a coalition condition.

    That’s a lot of fire and fury between politicians that have, by and large, left each other conspicuously outside the political firing line. The relative silence that Move Forward and its successor has maintained over the dubious situation around Thaksin’s return to Thailand and subsequent stay in the Police General Hospital has been noted by many observers. With disagreements continually bubbling between Pheu Thai and their coalition partners — over marijuana with Bhumjaithai, for example — this silence has been interpreted as a way to leave the door open for a reconciliation with Pheu Thai.

    So how do we make sense of Thaksin’s remarks and Thanathorn’s response? My take is that while they are interesting signals which show increased readiness to do open battle, Thaksin was being driven particularly by local dynamics: he was trying to differentiate his own local candidate in the Udon Thani Provincial Administrative Organization race and needed to take the People’s Party head on. Udon Thani, considered a capital of the red shirt movement, is a must-win province for Pheu Thai. The progressives have never won a PAO seat; its first being Udon Thani would send a seismic shift through the political scene.

    In remarks that has been given less attention, Thaksin has also been unable to resist taking shots at his new conservative allies. He criticized what he called the legacy of the 2014 military coup, arguing that it has created a bloated bureaucracy. Hardly a way to curry favor with the United Thai Nation Party, a key coalition partner which had been formed to support coupmaker Prayut Chan-o-cha. If Thaksin’s quotes are a way to tell which way Pheu Thai is leaning, we are getting mixed signals indeed.

    If there is anything we have learned from the past two years in Thai politics, it is that even the most deeply-rooted alliances are ephemeral and decades-long hatred can be set aside for a marriage of convenience. The current status quo is still working out for Pheu Thai and the conservative allies, sans Prawit who is still left in the cold. But despite Thaksin’s attacks on the progressives, it would not surprise me at all if when the situation changes Pheu Thai launches renewed overtures to the People’s Party.

  • The military drafted Constitution passed in the referendum in 2016 and implemented in 2017 is set to break the record of being the longest serving constitution since the 1960s given the current parliamentary quagmire.

    Over the past 92 years since Thailand’s transition to constitutional monarchy, the country has had 20 constitutions, and a quick math would show the average lifespan of each of these constitutions at about 4.6 years.

    The 2017 Constitution (as it is officially called) is extremely difficult to amend, and that is by design. Nicknamed the “Containment Constitution” by Allen Hicken — as he wrote in a New Mandala piece in 2016, the constitution was written to “contain vile and venal politicians, much as you would an infectious disease” — the constitution now feels like it has been placed in a secure lock with the key hidden away at the end of a complex obstacle course. 

    Pheu Thai, try as they might, has yet been unable to find the key. Although the party included constitutional reform as one of their pressing policy priorities in the run-up to the 2023 general election, calling it “a legacy of dictatorship” Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s administration now seems just as lost as her predecessor in trying to find a way to make constitutional amendment happen.

    Click here to read the full piece at Thai Enquirer.

  • Without a proper vision from the government and the determination to carry it out, education in Thailand is in danger of stagnating even more.

    In her policy statement to Parliament on September 12, Thailand’s newly appointed Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra said, “Thai education still has several qualitative obstacles and is unable to produce a workforce which meets the needs of the new economy.” Yet, in a highly anticipated speech on his vision for Thailand in late August, former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra outlined a packed list of initiatives but had remarkably little to say about education.

    The sad truth is that educational quality in the kingdom has fallen victim to politics. Without demonstrating political will for educational reform, including supporting a badly needed overhaul of the curriculum and furthering the capability of local schools, improving Thai education remains an insurmountable challenge.

    Click here to read the full piece at Fulcrum.

    (Cover image credits)

  • So first, the ignominious statistics.

    The People’s Party, since it became the now-dissolved Move Forward Party’s (MFP) successor party, has now contested three elections: local elections in Phitsanulok and Ratchaburi and the Constituency 1 by-election also in Phitsanulok.

    In the election for Provincial Administrative Organization (PAO) chairman in Phitsanulok, the People’s Party (PP) candidate Siripan Prajak-ubon came over 100,000 votes behind former chairman Monchai Wiwatthanat.

    As for the PAO election in Ratchaburi, the PP candidate Chairath Sakissarapong was defeated by the incumbent, independent candidate Wiwat Nitikanchana, by a margin of almost 70,000 votes. 

    And the latest by-elections on Sunday September 15th for the member of parliament (MP) seat, in Phitsanulok, Nathachanon Chanaburanasak from the PP was defeated by Pheu Thai Party’s (PTP) Jadet Jantar by around 7,000 votes. 

    Certainly, not an ideal start to the season for this new team. But while all three have been defeats, they tell different stories for the state of the People’s Party and the Thai political landscape at large.

    Click here to read the full piece at Thai Enquirer.

    (Cover image credits)